Abstract Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) argue that lower rainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks increase conflict risk in Sub-Saharan Africa. This conclusion rests on their finding of a negative correlation between conflict in t and rainfall growth between t-1 and t-2. I argue that this finding is driven by a positive correlation between conflict in t and rainfall levels in t-2. If lower rainfall levels or negative rainfall shocks increased conflict, one might have expected MSS's finding to reflect a negative correlation between conflict in t and rainfall levels in t-1. In the latest data, conflict is unrelated to rainfall.
Does poor economic performance cause violent civil conflict? Paul Anke Hoeffler's (1998, 2004) and James Fearon and David Laitin's (2003) empirical work suggests this is the case. Their findings are not based on exogenous changes in the economic environment however, and could reflect feedback from conflict to economic performance or omitted social and political factors. To address these concerns, Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti (MSS, 2004) examine the link between (exogenous) rainfall and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 1979 -1999 . Their empirics lead them to the conclusion that higher levels of rainfall are associated with significantly less conflict (e.g. MSS, page 737). Or, equivalently, lower rainfall levels are associated with significantly more conflict. MSS explain this association by negative rainfall shocks reducing incomes and thereby increasing conflict risk. Their focus on exogenous rainfall shocks is an important step forward. MSS's study has advanced quickly to one of the most cited articles on civil conflict, and their conclusion has become a cornerstone of the literature on the economics of civil conflict (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Collier, Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, 2009; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel, 2009 MSS's (2004) interpretation of the Sub-Saharan African rainfall and civil conflict data rests on their finding of a statistically significant negative correlation between civil conflict in year t and the year-on-year rainfall growth rate between t-1 and t-2. I argue that this finding is driven by a significantly positive correlation between conflict in year t and rainfall levels in year t-2. If 1 MSS is the 7th most cited article on the topics civil conflict or civil war in history, economics, political sciences, and sociology according to the ISI Web of Knowledge http://isiwebofknowledge.com/.
conflict was triggered by lower rainfall levels or negative rainfall shocks, one would have expected the negative correlation found by MSS to reflect a significantly negative correlation between conflict in t and rainfall levels in t-1. As civil conflict risk in MSS's data is not significantly higher following low rainfall levels or negative rainfall shocks, I argue that MSS's interpretation is an artifact of their empirical approach. The latest available datasets on rainfall and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa have been extended to 2009. In these data, there is no robust link between civil conflict and year-on-year rainfall growth or rainfall levels. This suggests that uncovering an effect of rainfall on civil conflict will require using more disaggregated data.
The main difference between my empirical approach and the empirical approach of MSS is that I focus on the correlation between civil conflict and current as well as lagged rainfall levels.
To see why, it is useful to start with the question whether lower rainfall levels are associated with more or with less civil conflict. MSS answer this question by examining the correlation between civil conflict and current as well as past year-on-year rainfall growth, while I address this question by examining the correlation between civil conflict and current as well as past rainfall levels.
2 These two empirical approaches (growth versus levels) need not yield the same answer as years with low year-on-year rainfall growth need not be years where rainfall levels are low. For example, low year-on-year rainfall growth may reflect that rainfall levels fell from a high level to the historical mean. To understand why MSS and I also reach different conclusions regarding the link between rainfall shocks and civil conflict, it is important to note that MSS's empirical approach uses year-on-year rainfall growth as a measure of rainfall shocks (MSS, page 733). As 2 Marshall B. Burke et al.'s (2009) and Halvard Buhaug's (2010) investigation of the effect of global warming on civil war risk in Africa also focuses on rainfall levels rather than rainfall growth rates.
rainfall levels are strongly mean reverting, rainfall growth between two years t and t-1 may be low because of a negative rainfall shock in t or because of a positive rainfall shock in t-1. Put differently, because rainfall shocks are transitory, low rainfall growth may reflect negative shocks or mean reversion following positive shocks. Inferring the effect of rainfall (transitory) shocks on civil conflict from the effect of year-on-year rainfall growth may therefore be misleading.
To see these points more precisely, it is useful to consider MSS's linear-probability model linking civil conflict to rainfall. Their model predicts the probability of civil conflict t PPconflict in year t based on current and lagged year-on-year rainfall growth, b . They then use this finding to make inferences about the effect of rainfall levels and rainfall shocks on conflict. To examine whether such inferences are feasible, suppose that rainfall levels are distributed identically and independently over time. This implies that rainfall levels are strongly mean reverting and that rainfall shocks are transitory. 3 Suppose also that the true probability of conflict t Pconflict depends on current and lagged log rainfall levels ( log R ),
3 Empirically, rainfall levels are strongly mean reverting. For example, regressing log rainfall levels on lagged log rainfall levels using MSS's data and controlling for country fixed effects, yields a system-GMM coefficient on lagged log rain of 0.17 with a standard error of 0.04.
Accounting for the empirical persistence of rainfall does not affect the conclusion but complicates the coefficient formulas in (3).
, the probability of conflict is lower following low rainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks (lower than expected rainfall levels). 4 Now imagine running a leastsquares regression to predict the probability of conflict based on current and lagged year-on-year rainfall growth as in (1). 
Making use of (2) The intuition for why one may find lower year-on-year rainfall growth to be associated with greater civil conflict risk even if negative rainfall shocks decrease conflict risk is the following.
Imagine an economy experiencing a negative rainfall shock and that this shock makes it unlikely that there is a civil conflict in the following year. Now consider the situation in the following year. Because of last year's negative rainfall shock, civil conflict will be unlikely by assumption.
Moreover, mean reversion implies that year-on-year rainfall growth will tend to be positive.
Imposing the restriction that civil conflict can be related to rainfall growth only, as in (1), will therefore yield that civil conflict is less likely following positive rainfall growth. If one goes a step further and also assumes that rainfall growth is a measure of rainfall shocks, the conclusion becomes that civil conflict is less likely following positive rainfall shocks.
The bottom line is that rainfall-growth specifications as in (1) cannot be used to make inferences about the effect of rainfall levels or rainfall shocks on civil conflict, as a negative 6 Lagged rain growth will enter negatively if and only if correlation between conflict and lagged year-on-year rainfall growth may not reflect higher civil conflict risk following lower rainfall levels or negative rainfall shocks. This concern turns out to be justified in MSS's data, as their finding of a negative correlation between civil conflict and year-on-year rainfall growth between t-1 and t-2 is driven by a (somewhat counter-intuitive)
positive correlation between conflict and rainfall levels in year t-2.
Another advantage of rainfall-level specifications as in (2) is that they nest rainfall-growth specifications. This allows using rainfall-level specifications to test the restrictions implicit in rainfall-growth specifications. For example, suppose the probability of civil conflict was in fact determined by lagged year-on-year rainfall growth, Hence, the rainfall-growth specification in (4) implies a negative coefficient on t-1 rainfall in a rainfall-level specification. This is quite intuitive: if high civil conflict risk was in fact caused by falling rainfall between t-2 and t-1, lower t-1 rainfall should be associated with greater civil conflict risk when t-2 rainfall is held constant. Rejection of the hypothesis that t-1 rainfall enters negatively in a rainfall-level specification implies rejection of the rainfall-growth specification in (4). I find that the data fail to support the hypothesis that t-1 rainfall enters negatively in a rainfall-level specification.
While the growth specification in (1) does not allow uncovering whether civil conflict is caused by transitory (rainfall) shocks, it can be used to examine whether conflict is caused by permanent shocks. To see this, suppose that the driving variable log t x follows a random walk The remainder of the paper examines the link between rainfall and civil conflict using the dataset employed by MSS as well as the latest available data. Additional empirical results can be found in a Web Appendix available at www.antoniociccone.eu.
II. Does civil conflict follow lower rainfall levels or negative rainfall shocks?
The conflict data come from the UCPD/PRIO Armed Conflict Database. I report results on the link between rainfall and either civil conflict onset or conflict incidence. Civil conflict onset is an indicator variable that captures conflict outbreak. The onset indicator in year t is 1 if there is a civil conflict in t but there was no conflict in t-1; 0 if there is no conflict in t and there was no conflict in t-1; and not defined if there was a conflict in t-1.
Conflict incidence, on the other hand, is an indicator variable that is 1 if there is a conflict in t and 0 if there is not. Hence, the conflict incidence indicator may be 1 because of the outbreak of a new conflict or the continuation of an existing conflict. Rainfall in year t is calculated as average annual rainfall.
All tables report two standard errors for each least-squares estimate. The standard errors in parentheses are consistent for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and time-series correlation within each country cluster. The standard errors in square brackets also make a small-sample adjustment. The statistical theory behind hypothesis tests using the small-sample-adjusted standard errors assumes normally distributed and homoskedastic residuals (e.g. William H. Greene, 1990, page 
II.A. Civil conflict onset (outbreak)
I first examine the link between rainfall and civil conflict onset in MSS's (2004) data and then turn to the latest versions of the databases employed by MSS. year-on-year rainfall growth and the GPCP rainfall data start in 1979, the earliest civil conflict onset observations employed correspond to 1981.) Column (1) shows that a least-squares regression of conflict onset in year t on current and lagged year-on-year rainfall growth yields a significantly negative coefficient on year t-1 rainfall growth (year-on-year rainfall growth between t-1 and t-2). The coefficient on t-1 rainfall growth is significant at the 90% confidence level, no matter which standard error is used. Does this empirical result imply that conflict onset is more likely following lower rainfall levels or negative rainfall shocks? This question can be answered by regressing conflict onset on current and lagged log rainfall levels as in column (2).
II.A.1. Conflict onset and rainfall in MSS's (2004) data
This yields that conflict onset is less likely following lower t-2 rainfall levels and negative t-2 rainfall shocks. The estimate indicating that conflict onset is less likely following lower rainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks is significant at the 95% confidence level, no matter which standard error is used.
II.A.2. Conflict onset and rainfall in the latest data
The latest UCDP/PRIO conflict dataset, (3)- (4) show that according to the latest data there is no significant link between civil conflict onset and rainfall levels or rainfall growth. 13 This continues to be the case when I control for shocks to the probability of civil conflict onset that are common to all Sub- (3)- (4) and (7)- (8).
15 See Web Appendix Tables II.A.1, II.B.1, and II.C.1, columns (3)- (4) and columns (7)- (8).
rainfall and temperature, there is some evidence that civil conflict onset over the period is less likely following low rainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks.
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II.B. Civil conflict incidence
I now turn to the link between rainfall and civil conflict incidence. Civil conflict incidence subsumes conflict onset (outbreak) and conflict continuation. Hence, the implicit assumption when using conflict incidence instead of conflict onset as the dependent variable is that rainfall affects conflict onset and conflict continuation in the same way. (2004) to reproduce their result that a least-squares regression of conflict incidence on current and lagged rainfall growth yields a significantly negative coefficient on t-1 rainfall growth.
II.B.1. Conflict incidence and rainfall in MSS's (2004) data
Columns (2) and (3) add lagged incidence to MSS's specification as the probability of civil conflict may depend on whether there already was a conflict in the previous year. Column (2) reports least-squares results while column (3) reports system-GMM results. 17 Not surprisingly, there is significant persistence in conflict incidence: civil conflict is 28 percentage points more 16 See Web Appendix Table III Table   III .C. 17 Least squares is inconsistent for a fixed time-series dimension (number of years), while system-GMM is consistent as the cross-sectional dimension goes to infinity even when the number of years is fixed, see Wooldridge (2002) , page 304. There is no small-sample adjustment for system-GMM, which is why only one standard error is reported for these results.
likely when there was a conflict in the previous year. The coefficients on current and lagged rainfall growth are similar to column (1).
Does the negative coefficient on lagged rainfall growth in the civil conflict incidence regressions in columns (2) and (3) imply that conflict incidence is associated with lower rainfall levels or that conflict follows negative rainfall shocks? The statistically significant estimates in columns (4) and (5) shed doubt on such a conclusion. Relating civil conflict incidence to current and lagged log rainfall levels yields that conflict is less likely following lower t-2 rainfall and that the coefficient on t-2 rainfall is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level according to the system-GMM result and the least-squares result with and without the small-sample adjustment. The results in columns (4) and (5) also imply that civil conflict incidence is less likely following negative rainfall shocks. Table 2 , columns (6)-(9) examine the link between civil conflict incidence and rainfall over the 1979-2009 period using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database Version 4-2010 and the GPCP Combined Precipitation Dataset Version 2.1. It can be seen that the data do not support the hypothesis that conflict incidence follows lower rainfall levels or negative rainfall shocks. If anything, the statistically significant coefficients in columns (8) and (9) territory; or when I control for shocks to the probability of civil conflict onset that are common to all Sub-Saharan African countries. 19 The data continue to reject the hypothesis that conflict incidence follows lower rainfall levels or negative rainfall shocks when I control for shocks to the probability of civil conflict that are common to all Column (1) shows that a least-squares regression of war onset in year t on current and lagged rainfall growth yields a significantly negative coefficient on rainfall growth in t. The coefficient is significant at the 90% confidence level, no matter which standard error is used. The corresponding rainfall level specification in column (4) shows that this result cannot be interpreted as civil war onset being more likely following low rainfall levels or negative rainfall shocks. According to the results in column (4), civil war onset is either unrelated to rainfall levels and shocks or significantly less likely following low rainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks in t-1, depending on the standard error used. It is worth noting that the statistically significant coefficients in column (1) and (4) turn insignificant when I follow Jensen and Gleditsch (2009) and focus on civil wars on countries' own territory or when I control for shocks to the probability of civil war onset that are common to all Sub-Saharan African countries. 25 The table also shows that there is no statistically significant link between rainfall levels or rainfall shocks and civil war incidence. These results continue to hold when I control for shocks to the probability of civil war that are common to all Sub-Saharan African countries, 26 and when I focus on the 1979-2008 period and control for temperature. 
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II.B.2. Conflict incidence and rainfall in the latest data
IV. Conclusion
Two of the conclusions of Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti's (2004) study of civil conflict and rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa are that lower rainfall levels and adverse rainfall shocks increase conflict risk. These conclusions rest on their finding of a negative correlation between conflict in year t and year-on-year rainfall growth between t-1 and t-2. I argue that such a negative correlation between conflict and lagged year-on-year rainfall growth may not reflect that civil conflict risk is higher following lower rainfall levels or adverse rainfall shocks. This concern turns out to be justified in MSS's data, as the negative correlation between civil conflict and yearon-year rainfall growth between t-1 and t-2 found by MSS is driven by a (somewhat counterintuitive) positive correlation between civil conflict and rainfall levels in year t-2. If civil conflict was triggered by lower rainfall levels or negative rainfall shocks, one would have expected the negative correlation found by MSS to reflect a negative correlation between civil conflict in t and rainfall levels in t-1.
The latest available datasets on rainfall and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa have been extended to 2009. In these data, there is no robust link between civil conflict and year-on-year rainfall growth or rainfall levels. This suggests that uncovering an effect of rainfall on civil conflict risk will require using more disaggregated data. The left-hand-side variable is an indicator variable capturing civil conflict onset (see p.7 in the main text). The method of estimation is least squares. Standard errors in parentheses are robust for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustered at the country level. Standard errors in square brackets also apply the STATA small-sample adjustment (see p.8 in the main text). *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. When the asterisks are next to the least-squares point estimate, the confidence level applies no matter which of the two standard errors is employed. When the asterisks are next to the standard error, the confidence level applies to that standard error only. 
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